Sui announced plans to integrate two NIST-approved post-quantum signature schemes into its protocol, targeting quantum-safe vaults for mainnet later this year and native account authentication for mainnet in the first quarter of 2027.
The announcement centered on a risk specific to blockchains that does not apply to most other systems. When a Sui account executes a transaction, its public key becomes permanently visible on-chain. In conventional infrastructure, an attacker typically needs a security breach before targeting a key. On a blockchain, the key is already published and available to anyone who monitors the ledger. Harvest-now-forge-later collection does not require quantum hardware today. It requires a visible key and patience. An attacker can archive exposed public keys now and wait for sufficiently powerful machines to become available.
In March 2026, Google Quantum AI estimated that recovering a private key from an exposed public key could run in minutes on a fault-tolerant quantum computer using fewer than 500,000 physical qubits. Shor's algorithm, which would perform that attack, breaks the elliptic-curve cryptography securing most blockchain accounts today, the same math underlying banking systems and most of the internet.
The regulatory timeline has also accelerated. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology previously planned to deprecate classical algorithms by 2030 and prohibit them by 2035. Executive Order 14412, signed in June 2026, pulls that deadline forward for federal agencies' sensitive systems: post-quantum key establishment by the end of 2030 and post-quantum digital signatures by the end of 2031.
Two algorithms for two different threat models
Rather than selecting a single post-quantum algorithm, Sui chose two schemes built on different mathematical foundations. A discovered weakness in one would not compromise the other.
For everyday user accounts, Sui will integrate ML-DSA-65 directly into the protocol. This is the Level 3 parameter set defined under NIST's FIPS 204 standard. Sui intentionally selected Level 3 over the cheaper Level 1 option. The reasoning traces to a July 2026 incident in which researchers used an AI model to reduce the effective security of the HAWK post-quantum signature candidate after prior expert review. Sui said that incident did not affect ML-DSA, but it reinforced the case for stronger security margins. ML-DSA-65 already appears in several deployed systems: Chrome and Cloudflare use the same security level for post-quantum encryption covering more than half of human-initiated web traffic, AWS Key Management Service now supports ML-DSA signing, and Android 17's Keystore generates quantum-safe signatures using ML-DSA-65 inside secure hardware.
For high-value assets, Sui will use SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, the hash-based signature scheme standardized under FIPS 205. Rather than embedding it into the core protocol, Sui will implement it through Move smart contracts, allowing vaults to adopt post-quantum security without requiring changes to the network's underlying consensus or state model.
Existing recovery phrases remain valid under the migration path
One of the practical obstacles in any quantum migration is key rotation. Sui addressed it through its deterministic key architecture. Quantum-safe private keys can be derived from the same recovery phrases users already hold today. No new backup is required. Wallet restoration continues through existing seed phrases, while new derivation paths generate ML-DSA-65 keys.
Existing accounts also avoid the disruption of transferring assets to new addresses. Address aliases, already deployed on Sui, allow users to replace their authorization keys with post-quantum keys while retaining the same wallet address and asset balances. The alias system means users do not need to update counterparties, application settings, or stored address references.
The main trade-off is transaction size. Post-quantum signatures and public keys occupy substantially more space than Ed25519 keys. Verification costs remain much closer to existing signatures than the larger key sizes suggest, and Sui said transaction size limits and programmable transaction blocks can accommodate the additional data while optimization work continues. Support for ML-DSA-65 will also extend to Sui's multisignature authenticator, enabling accounts to require both a classical Ed25519 signature and a post-quantum ML-DSA-65 signature before authorizing any transaction.
Where implementation stands and what the rollout timeline looks like
Sui said the core implementation is complete and benchmarked. Independent security audits are currently underway. Quantum-safe vaults are scheduled for mainnet deployment later in 2026. Native ML-DSA-65 accounts are targeted for testnet before the end of 2026, with native account authentication on mainnet and wallet, SDK, and CLI support targeted for the first quarter of 2027. Both timelines remain open while audit results and testnet feedback are incorporated.
The rollout follows the same optional deployment model Sui used for zkLogin and passkeys. Existing accounts, applications, and smart contracts continue operating without modification. Developers do not need to update applications immediately.
What other blockchain projects have done on quantum security
Sui's announcement is part of a broader industry movement. In May, BNB Chain reported successful testing of ML-DSA-44 transaction signatures and pqSTARK consensus aggregation for BSC. That testing also showed signature sizes growing from 65 bytes to roughly 2,420 bytes, with transaction throughput falling by approximately 40% to 50% because of larger blocks and increased network traffic. BNB Chain concluded that post-quantum migration could work with existing wallets but acknowledged the performance costs.
BitGo introduced quantum-risk management tools in July 2026. Those tools measure public-key exposure, group UTXOs to minimize the balances left behind at exposed addresses, and help institutions move assets to fresh addresses after public keys become visible on-chain.
AmericanFortress published a design through the International Association for Cryptologic Research's ePrint archive proposing a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Seed Provenance system. That proposal would allow existing Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana addresses to prove ownership through zero-knowledge proofs without requiring key rotation or asset transfers, though deployment would still depend on protocol upgrades and wallet provider adoption.
Jordan V.
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